The agony of democracy in Europe
Christopher Caldwell reports on the conflicts between elite institutions & populist movements
Prof. Harvey Mansfield invited the best American writer on European politics, Christopher Caldwell, to talk about the transformations of elite-populist politics in 21st c. Europe—primarily, in Germany & Poland, but also France & Italy. The major problem Caldwell deals with is the loss of sovereignty to the EU & to the US, & the major issue now is illegal immigration. This will get much worse in the next generation, as immigration pressure increases beyond anything now contemplated, while the population of Baby Boomers dwindles, & with so the defining habits & beliefs about gov’t & civil society change.
Caldwell describes the political drama & its recent history very well, because he is especially attentive to its democratic aspect. The parties now called “rightwing” or “far right” or “extreme right” are almost entirely the opposite of any image such terms might evoke. Instead, these parties, with their ups & downs, are organizations that speak up for the less well off: The older, less wealthy, less educated, less urbanized people who have not benefited much from 21st c. globalization & seek the protection of the state. This would have been called center-left before the ‘90s. We see the same problem in America: The GOP is now the party of democracy—against the desires or plans of GOP elites—because its new electorate is really the less wealthy half of America. Both the hysteria typical of media depictions & the wishful rightwing talk of resurgence of nationalism or of conservatism are quite unlikely, because they are largely alien to the voters. This could change as political conflicts lead to statements & embracing of partisan principles, of course.
Caldwell also emphasizes that the crucial problem is that elites believe themselves to be benefitted by globalization & don’t believe that they owe protection to the less well off—or, as the case may be, that globalization cannot be stopped or that it’s not really necessary to stop it, because the conflicts are short-term. In short, there is something left of Progress in the beliefs of our elites, though obviously self-serving, a belief in moving toward the End of History, beyond principled conflict. The elite analysis at this level is based on the facts of the case, so it’s not so easy to dismiss it: The most educated, most urbanized, most well off, & newest recipients of good fortune are pro-globalization. Above all, that would be unmarried women with a college degree who work in corporations. The negative correlative to this positive argument is that opponents of globalization cannot get their act together. Their victories are short-term, local, ambiguous. There is much truth in this, but it’s not clear, at least to me, that the conclusions we should draw are friendly to Progressives. I am not even sure Progressives themselves believe in Progress, since they seem to find it very difficult to run anything or cultivate talent, too.