The Powell Doctrine and Just War Theory
In honor of Colin Powell, who passed today at age 84, I am posting a paper I wrote in graduate school but never published discussing the “Powell Doctrine” on military intervention. May he rest in peace.
https://www.academia.edu/58861720/The_Powell_Doctrine_and_Just_War_Theory?source=swp_share
Here is a clip from the paper:
The "Powell Doctrine"
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell explained his own version of the Weinberger Doctrine. These criteria were slightly different than the original doctrine, and came to be known in the media as the "Powell Doctrine":
I. There must be a vital national security risk.
2. There must be a clear objective.
3. The risks must be frankly analyzed.
4. All non-violent policy means should be exhausted.
5. There must be an exit strategy.
6. The consequences of our action must be considered.
7. There must be support from the American people.
8. There should be international support.
The first major difference from the Weinberger doctrine is that instead of a "vital national interest," a "vital national security interest" must be at stake. This limiting of what interests are included might change whether U.S. Commerce interests would be defended, as they were with the Naval Convoy mission. The other major additions are that "risks must be frankly analyzed," that "consequences of action must be considered," that there "must be an exit strategy," and that there should be " international support." The "risks" and "consequences" criteria seem somewhat redundant in this list; including them is sort of like including an 11th commandment that says, "obey the commandments." The " exit strategy" requirement, on the other hand, is very significant, and reflects Powell's personal experience in Vietnam. The call for " international support" is also significant. It likely played a role in some people's consideration of the 2nd War with Iraq, when many insisted upon approval from the United Nations. The "Powell Doctrine" was only one aspect of Colin Powell's influence on the Persian Gulf War.
As Peter Rodman says, "Bush, Scowcroft, and Chaney could also see that Powell was personally reluctant to contemplate offensive military operations." The reason Powell was holding out was that he was unsure of the support of the American people, part of his own and Weinberger's criteria. For this reason, Powell advised diplomatic efforts, since a full war to liberate Kuwait might involve too many troops for the American people's liking. Powell went so far as to question in a meeting, "Was it worth war to liberate Kuwait?" Bush's avowed answer was "Yes, let's do it." Powell was chastised by Dick Chaney after the meeting, who said:
“Colin, you're Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You're not Secretary of State. You're not the National Security Advisor anymore. And you're not Secretary of Defense. So stick to military matters.”
Powell admitted that he was "out of his bounds" on this one.