It is possible to read a text so closely that you blind yourself.
That’s what Fr. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., said has happened over and over again with Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica: readers develop “myopia” or tunnel-vision. They look so closely at the section on the precepts of natural law, the famous Part I-II, Question 94, Article 2, that they ignore the entire rest of the section on law, they ignore that the section on law is part of a larger philosophical discussion on how to achieve happiness through virtues like justice, and they ignore that the philosophical discussion of happiness and the virtues is part of a larger work on theology where the power of grace infuses the virtues to change their aspect (see the diagram below). It really is quite the tunnel vision to only read sentences on the 3 first principles of natural law and claim that’s all Aquinas had to say about ethics!
But sometimes an exercise in microscopic reading actually is the best way for us to understand a larger whole, when it is done well. I think I have a way of doing this with the famous Question 94 of the Summa. Even though so many people in the history of Western thought have been led to false impressions about Aquinas’ overall ethical scheme, if I as the teacher get one lecture to teach Aquinas, (by God!) I am going to teach Question 94. Here is the text, by the way:
Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
So, most teachers summarize this by saying that Aquinas espoused 3 first principles of natural law: 1) preservation of life, 2) procreation of children, 3) contemplation of truth. These are basic human inclinations which we have a moral duty to protect and provide for all individuals no matter the customs or human laws of the country we live in.
Is that a good summary? It’s OK- but it leaves out alot. It makes it easy to memorize, of course. Aquinas’ discussion has had a tendency to get abridged. Later thinkers in the natural law and natural rights tradition did just that- from Suarez to Richard Hooker to Locke to the American Founders. The more Modern you go, the more the duties of natural law get reduced down to just the bare minimum of 1) preserve life, and not much more. Preserving life is in a sense fundamental of course, since you have to be alive to even try to fulfill the other needs, but it’s a much reduced idea of the good life every human has a deep desire for and a moral right to.
What does an abridgment leave out, just in terms of what Aquinas says? The two things most Thomists point out are these: First, Aquinas doesn’t say there are only three first principles; maybe there are more, if you could rationally justify them as natural inclinations of all human beings. Second, Aquinas in a later article talks about the secondary precepts of natural law, the more specific applications of the primary precepts (such as do not murder people when it comes to the primary precept of preserving life), which ALSO have the force of moral obligation.
But I would like to call attention to the way most people summarize the 3rd first principle of natural law, as “the contemplation of truth.” The full quote from Aquinas again is:
Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
What’s left out is that the truth we consider is about God, and that business about living with others in society; are those parts actually that important? Yes, they actually are. Leaving aside the part about God (basically all truth is in the mind of God in a more perfect way than we could ever know it in this life for Aquinas), consider the part, “to live in society” (in Latin: “et ad hoc quod in societate vivat”).
This principle actually connects Aquinas to an essential strand of the tradition of virtue ethics. Many people would think it is EASY to fulfill the natural law duty “to live in society” with others, because they just think it entails social virtues such as politeness, gentleness, charm, friendliness, etc- the sort of thing Aristotle talks about in Nicomachean Ethics book IV. But the text of Aristotle you should be reading to understand Aquinas here is Aristotle’s Politics book I, chapter 2: that all “man is by nature a political animal” and that “a man who is incapable of entering into community, or on account of self-sufficiency has need of nothing, is no part of a polis, so then he is either a beast or a god.”
As Adam Seagrave argues, Aquinas was not only influenced by Aristotle but also the Stoic tradition (through his teacher St. Albert). Aquinas read Cicero’s De Officiis, where the ancient Roman statesman claimed the fulfillment of several inclinations of natural law helped make up the human good:
Our starting point is that all species of living creatures are endowed by nature with the capacity to protect their lives and their persons, to avoid things likely to harm them, and to seek out and procure all life’s necessities such as food, hidden lairs and the like. Again all living creatures share the instinct to copulate for the procreation of offspring and once these are begotten, they show a degree of concern to look after them… Nature also joins individuals together, enabling them by the power of reason to share a common language and life. She especially infuses in them love for their offspring; she constrains men to aspire to gatherings and meetings, and to take part in them, and for these reasons to lay in adequate supplies of clothing and food, not merely for themselves but also for their wives, children, and the others dear to them whom they should protect. Such responsibility further kindles men’s spirits, and develops them for the performance of tasks.
Especially unique to man is the search and scrutiny into truth. This is why, when we are free from unavoidable business and concerns, we are eager to see, hear, and learn things. We reckon that the acquisition of knowledge of hidden or remarkable features is necessary for the happy life. This fact enables us to appreciate that what is true, simple, and genuine is most suited to man’s nature. Associated with this eagerness for the vision of the truth is a kind of aspiration for leadership, so that the mind well fashioned by nature is willing to obey only a moral guide or teacher or commander who issues just and lawful orders for our benefit. From such an attitude greatness of soul develops, and indifference to purely human concerns.
However, it is no trivial dispensation of nature and reason which makes man alone of living creatures aware of the nature of order and propriety and due measure in deeds and words. The result is that no other creature shares his awareness of the beauty, charm, and harmonious structure which lie before our eyes; and nature and reason, transferring this by analogy from eyes to mind, judge and ensure that such beauty, regularity, and order are to be maintained much more in our designs and actions. Their concern is to do nothing which is unsightly or degenerate, to do or to contemplate nothing capricious in all our actions and beliefs.
These are the qualities which kindle and fashion the honorable conduct which we seek.-Cicero, De Officiis, book I
This natural law precept proves to be crucial in the later chapters of De Officiis, where Cicero explains that when justice and what is expedient/useful conflict, we ought to choose justice. We should do that because of the natural law precept I’ve been talking about, living with others in society:
If a person deprives his neighbor of something, and furthers his own advantage by another’s loss, such behavior flies in the face of nature more than death or poverty or pain or anything which can affect our persons or our external possessions; for first and foremost it undermines the fellowship and alliance between members of the human race. Should the spirit move us to plunder or to assault our neighbor for our own profit, that fellowship between the human race which so closely accords with nature must inevitably be dismantled…
…This principle, that it is wrong to harm a neighbor for one’s own profit, is laid down not only by nature as reflected in international law, but also by the decree of nations, which uphold the public interest in individual states. This is the aim and purpose of laws, to keep intact the unifying bonds between citizens. Those who seek to sunder them are restrained by sentence of death, or exile, or imprisonment, or fine. This principle is established much more effectively by the rational of nature itself, which is the law laid down by the gods and men. The person who seeks to comply with it (and all who wish to accord with nature will comply with it) will never decide to lay hands on another’s property, or to obtain for himself the possessions of which he has deprived his neighbor. The truth is that a lofty and noble spirit, and attitudes of courtesy, justice, and generosity, are much more in harmony with nature than are pleasure, mere living, and riches. It is the mark of that noble and lofty spirit to despise these last, and to account them as nothing compared to the common good.-Cicero, De Officiis, book III
Cicero helps make clear the MASSIVE importance that the Medieval Friar Aquinas’ little principle about the naturalness of fellowship with others in society has for justice and the common good.
Good contemporary thinkers back up Aquinas on “living in society” being a natural law precept too. Alasdair MacIntyre argues in his book Dependent Rational Animals that a normally functioning human being needs interaction with other human beings in order for basic rational development to occur, at all points of his or her life. Modern philosophers like D.A.J. Richards ) or jurists (like Anthony Kennedy) who hold that we can be radically autonomous individuals are believers in myths- not according to philosophy, but according to the modern empirical science of biology and developmental human psychology.
So, a myopic reading of this very important line from Question 94 of the Summa actually can give you a picture of the whole. Sadly though, almost no one pays attention to Aquinas when he writes that it is a natural inclination of human nature “to live in society.”
Interesting, Chris. I see what you've been teaching, and thinking about, the past year or two (or three or more). This makes sense of your Cicero's the man! comments over at fb. If I get a minute, I'll pen some thoughts on what you've said. Without being mean, I do note that you go outside of 94,2, despite the microscopic promise. To me that indicates that it's impossible to stay just within one of Thomas's texts and discussions. He uses terms and phrases that he develops elsewhere. He qualifies assertions and arguments. But it is true that we should milk each particular text for all it is worth.
One external comment: since natural law is introduced in 91, 2, that's where I start when I teach natural law. But I never teach natural law just by itself. I put it in the context of all the kinds of law, and the complex teaching on virtue. After all, Thomas himself said that natural law is inadequate. It needs positive law and it needs divine law. But you know all that.
So what's the Aquinas view of the death of Socrates? What's natural law's appeal to the individual good & the laws of the city?